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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000435

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TAGS: [CD](#) [CT](#) [PREL](#) [SU](#) [UNSC](#) [KPKO](#)  
SUBJECT: NO SUPPORT FOR UNSCR 1706 AS HYBRID BASIS FOR  
DARFUR

REF: A. SECSTATE 75006

[1](#)B. USUN NEW YORK 00407

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

[1](#)1. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad convened a June 1 meeting of the Security Council Permanent Three Members to deliver ref A points. Participating in the meeting were UK Permanent Representative (PR) Emyr Jones Parry, UN Counsellor Paul Johnston, French Charge Jean-Marie Lacroix, French Counsellor Nicolas de Riviere, French Poloff Clement LeClerc, USUN Deputy PolCouns and Poloff.

NEED NEW RESOLUTION AS A PRACTICAL MATTER . . .

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2.(C) Ambassador Khalilzad presented to P3 counterparts the importance of proceeding under the authority of UNSCR 1706 (2006) to mandate the United Nations (UN) - African Union (AU) hybrid operation in Darfur. Consistent with previous discussions, neither UK PermRep Jones Parry nor French Charge Lacroix saw any way for the Council to authorize the hybrid based solely on 1706. Jones Parry commented that to do so could hurt the Council, since 1706 never received Sudanese consent, as indicated in OP1 of that resolution, and was accordingly never implemented (NOTE: Jones Parry and Lacroix made absolutely clear that the UK and France read OP1 of 1706 as requiring, vice inviting, Khartoum's consent to any UN peacekeeping operation as a practical if not legal matter. END NOTE). To link the hybrid to such an un-implementable text "would not get us anywhere," Jones Parry declared. UK Counsellor Johnston noted that de-linking the two resolutions could also help secure Sudanese consent, since Khartoum had objected to several provisions of 1706, including OP8(j) and (k) on restructuring the police service and promoting rule of law.

[1](#)3. (C) French Charge Lacroix agreed, adding that 1706 had been adopted "in a completely different context." He expressed hope that if Sudanese consent were secured for a new hybrid resolution, the text could potentially be adopted by consensus, signaling "a new page" in the Council's dealings on Darfur. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Africa Director Titov said as much to Deputy PolCouns on May 29 when he advised that "if you want to 'rough up Khartoum,' go with 1706; however, if you want to try to start a new, cooperative chapter, go with a new resolution using the language of the UN-AU report."

. . . ALSO FOR FINANCIAL REALITIES

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[1](#)4. (C) In addition to the political rationale behind seeking a new resolution on the hybrid, Jones Parry argued there were financial reasons as well. A new resolution would be

necessary to avoid ambiguities in approaching the Fifth Committee for funding. DPKO Africa Director Titov confirmed this logic to Deputy PolCouns on May 29, explaining that the UN Comptroller needed "explicit text" to implement the Addis Ababa Agreements, beyond the scope of a letter from the Security Council President to the Secretary-General (SYG), as was done to finance the Heavy Support Package (HSP), or a Presidential Statement. DPKO noted it had been hard enough to get the UN Comptroller to move on the HSP with only a letter, let alone on a package exceeding a billion dollars per year.

UN-AU AGREEMENT ON REPORT STILL OUTSTANDING

15. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad stressed that effective protection of civilians, as demanded by 1706, was essential, a point with which both the UK and France heartily agreed. Jones Parry said that if the hybrid report, still under negotiation between the UN and the AU, were insufficient in this regard, "then we'll send it back to them." DPKO Under-SYG Guehenno needed P3 support to come to an agreement with AU Commission Chairman Konare, according to Jones Parry. According to UKUN, SYG Ban had threatened to forgo agreement with Konare on the hybrid report if it meant backing down on specific provisions, presumably those dealing with command and control. To avoid a UN-AU split on their joint peacekeeping venture, all P3 members agreed to encourage quietly both Ban and Konare to agree the report as soon as possible. Otherwise, Ambassador Khalilzad warned, the planned June 5-6 consultative briefings with the Sudanese Government on the text would not take place and the whole process would be delayed (NOTE: In subsequent Security Council consultations, SYG Ban announced that the AU had reverted with changes to the hybrid report as submitted to the Council per ref B. We will report on these changes

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septel. END NOTE).  
KHALILZAD